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Japan again seems to be breaking out of the doldrums it has been in since the early 1990s.  In 
this paper, I begin by assessing the past year ending in summer 2015.  I first consider the 
economic situation; Japanese trade policy, specifically its involvement in the TPP and AIIB; and 
the latest political developments, particularly the results of Abe’s snap election of December 
2014.  I then examine the international and regional financial context, with China and India 
leading regional economic growth.  Following this overview, I delve into the goals and progress 
of Abenomics: ending deflation and achieving 2 percent inflation; achieving 2 percent growth 
by increasing productivity; dealing with Japan’s huge debt with flexible fiscal policy; and 
addressing Japan’s low birth rate by increasing fertility and promoting women’s rights.  I focus 
especially on the third arrow of Abenomics – achieving sustained growth – by making difficult 
structural changes, notably opening up markets in historically-protected sectors such as 
agriculture and healthcare, as well as more modest initiatives in corporate management and 
governance, promoting information technology, opening Japan to 60,000 foreign skilled 
workers a year, and strengthening the university system by creating distinguished graduate 
schools and special research institutions.  I then consider further specifics about corporate 
governance, which Abe has made a focus of his efforts.  Finally, I examine the vast changes 
occurring in Japan’s energy sector, which hold much promise with the development of 
renewable technologies and possible restarting of its nuclear plants – idled since the Great East 
Japan Earthquake in 2011 – but which also faces many challenges, considering Japan’s dearth of 




Japan’s Abenomics Bumps Along 
 
Japan now again seems to be breaking out of the doldrums it has been in since the early 1990s.  Even 
though the daily news makes one wonder, I retain my optimism and faith, based on some six decades of 
studying Japan and watching it grow and evolve. I have addressed this theme in previous essays, and 
despite the subsequent ups and downs, I believe it applies today. 
 Deflation is well on the way to being brought to an end, but growth has been erratic. GDP 
declined by 0.9 percent in fiscal 2014 (ending March 31, 2015) because of the recession in the first two 
quarters, but finished strong, with substantial increases in the last two quarters. Recovery this year was 
jolted by a bad April–June quarter with a decline of 1.2 percent, and what now appears a tepid and 
uncertain recovery, and a flat and possibly negative summer quarter. Nevertheless, projections are that 
Japan will achieve reasonably good growth for the next two years. After that, much depends on the 
adverse demand effects of the scheduled further consumption tax increase to 10 percent in April 2017, 
and indeed whether that takes place. 
 The next two sections are a brief review of the economy and the international context. I then 
take up various aspects of Abenomics, including longer-run growth prospects, corporate governance, 
and Japan’s energy sector, focusing on electricity.  
 
The Year in Review 
 
- Domestic Economic Situation 
 
The past 18 months have been a process of implementation of and adjustment to Abenomics policies, 
notably the consumption tax increase from 5 to 8 percent from April 2014. The negative impact on 
consumption and business investment was deeper and longer lasting than I had expected. With lagging 
aggregate demand, GDP dropped by 6.8 percent (at a seasonally adjusted annual rate) in the second 
quarter of 2014, and a further 2.0 percent in the third quarter, before rising 1.2 percent in the final 
quarter, and a very good 4.5 percent in the first quarter of 2015. However, the second preliminary data 
for the second quarter, announced in early September, were a negative 1.2 percent despite inventory 
build-up, as consumption decreased. Even with the yen/dollar depreciation from 101 in June 2014 to a 
120-125 range in summer 2015, export volumes lagged until recently, though of course their yen values 
and export profits increased significantly.  
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 Japan’s unemployment rate, 3.3 percent in July, is the lowest it has been since April 1997 and it 
has been at the low end of the 3.3-3.7 range since December 2013. However, many part-time 
employees want regular, full-time positions. In the spring 2015 annual adjustments, wages edged up 
about 2.2 percent, slightly better than 2014. However, this did not compensate fully for the 
consumption tax increase, so in real terms wages were flat. 
 Deflation has probably ended, but price stability defined as a 2 percent increase in the CPI net of 
the consumption tax rise has yet to be achieved. Corporate profits have soared, their highest ever, and 
business domestic investment is beginning to pick up. Economic recovery has generated a much more 
responsive increase (higher elasticity) in tax revenue than in the longer run, 3.97 trillion yen above 
budget in 2014, and a further surplus is projected for 2015. This windfall has given the government 
sufficient revenues to delay the difficult process of cutting expenditures or raising taxes. However, 
consumer confidence has weakened, and concerns have been voiced that the recovery may be weak in 
the last part of 2015. 
 The Bank of Japan’s very low interest rate policy persists, and financial markets have continued 
to be very easy. The benchmark 10-year government bond (JBG) yield has trended down since April 
2011, and although above its low in January has been between 0.3 and 0.4 percent in September. The 
most notable change has been in stock prices: driven by corporate profit increases, the Topix index rose 
20 percent in the year ending August 1. Though it has since backed off, the index has more than doubled 
from a November 2012 low. 
 
- Japanese Trade Policy 
 
 Over the course of this past year Japan has been constructively involved in two major trade 
policies: TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) and AIIB (Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank). Both have 
become symbols of Japanese, US, and other countries’ commitment to economic openness and to Asia.  
 TPP goes beyond reduction of tariff and other trade barriers; it establishes new rules and 
requires significant institutional change, including intellectual property protection, the treatment of 
state-owned enterprises, and dispute resolution. TPP excludes China and has flaws and difficulties in 
implementation, but I support it as a realistic way forward.  
 The other 11 TPP members were unwilling to make final offers until they were certain the 
proposed agreement would only be subject to US Congressional acceptance or rejection without 
amendment. The Obama administration finally succeeded in having fast-track Trade Promotion 
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Authority (TPA) passed in June. Japan and the US apparently have reached agreement on most of their 
major bilateral issues, including tariff reductions for beef, pork, dairy products, sugar, and rice. On 
October 5, following intense negotiations, the 12 countries signed the TPP agreement.  It now has to be 
approved both by the governments of the other countries and by the U.S. Congress.  Congress will have 
at least 90 days to review the contentious agreement before accepting or rejecting it. 
 Creation of the AIIB, initiated by China, has been more significant politically than economically. 
The economic justification of providing more funding for good infrastructure projects is straightforward. 
Two major issues have dominated the debate: how to deal with the rise of China as a major power 
creating a new financial institution where it will play a dominant role; and how to ensure that AIIB 
lending criteria, project evaluation structure, and operational management meet global best practice 
standards, emulating the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). 
 The U.S. government initially opposed the AIIB, and pressured its allies and other friends not to 
become a member. This was a strategic and diplomatic mistake, even though the government was 
deeply aware of narrow-minded Congressional opposition to reforming the IMF (International Monetary 
Fund) and the World Bank, much less the creation of new institutions.  However, in March 2015 the 
United Kingdom decided to join, and by the April 15 deadline some 57 countries had signed on as 
prospective founding members, including 16 European countries. The United States, Japan, and Canada 
are the only major countries that have not yet joined. The United States has now stated it will be 
supportive of the AIIB once it develops best international practices.  
 The AIIB is a complex issue for Japan. Japan has major influence over the ADB, whose president 
has always been Japanese. While competitive overlap is inevitable, both ADB and AIIB propose co-
operating on some projects. Given the current disputes between China and Japan, trust is not high. 
 The AIIB is scheduled to begin operation by the end of this year. China now well understands 
how the AIIB is expected to perform. AIIB’s behavior and performance over the coming five to ten years 
will determine whether it will be a success or a weak institution foundering because of poor projects, 
perhaps politically chosen, unable to repay their borrowings. Japan’s decision to join would signal a 
judgment that China is committed to engage in good corporate governance to make the AIIB an 
effective global organization contributing to infrastructure investment.  
 
- Domestic Political Development  
 
4 
 In November 2014, Abe surprised everyone by calling a snap Lower House election for 
December 2014. In the absence of any serious opposition, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won 
handily, maintaining a two-thirds majority together with its coalition partner Komeito. With his re-
election as LDP president in September, I assume Abe will continue as prime minister until 2018, and 
perhaps will revise the rules to enable a third three-year term as LDP president and prime minister 
through the 2020 Olympics. He will continue to give top priority both to economic policy (Abenomics) 
and his national security objectives.  With the security legislation passed, Abenomics will be the top 
priority in the Diet in the coming months at least.   
 
The International Context 
 
The World Bank June 2015 forecast was for global growth to increase modestly to 2.8 percent in 2015, 
and then to 3.3 percent in 2016 and 3.2 percent in 2017, led by the now catch-up growth of many 
developing economies, notably China and India with their huge populations. Even though many 
economies are recovering reasonably well from the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, these are 
disquieting times, with the US and Europe involved in the terrible difficulties emanating from the Middle 
East. 
 The global financial system will continue to be dominated by the dollar and the euro as the 
currencies for transactions, payments, foreign exchange revenues and stores of wealth. Regarding 
discussion of a global role for China’s renminbi (yuan), the lessons from Japan are instructive. Despite its 
ascent to the world’s second largest economy and the Japanese government’s efforts to promote its 
use, the yen still does not have a significant third-country role. Indeed, as recently as 2010 some 60 
percent of Japan-China trade was in U.S. dollars. With the introduction of direct yen-yuan currency 
trading in 2012, this is changing. 
 There never is a simple story for any region of the world. The U.S. economy is doing increasingly 
well. Europe continues to go through difficult times, not only economically but also socially, with the 
huge influx of migrants and refugees. The Middle East is a quagmire. Russia is Russia. Brazil’s major 
corruption scandal involving its giant oil producer Petrobras has halted growth. 
 Sustained East Asian development is the big economic growth story of the last six decades: first 
Japan, then South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, and now China, Indonesia, and the other 
ASEAN countries. Developing Asia, notably China and India, has been and will continue to be the major 
engine of global growth. The region will probably continue to grow at a 5 percent to 6 percent rate over 
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the coming decade. China’s growth has slowed, but still apparently is on the order of 6 percent to 7 
percent. And 5 percent growth is projected for the 10 ASEAN nations. 
 The most important global change has been the dramatic economic and political rise of China. 
This has significantly altered the geo-strategic environment. Japan’s quiet leadership in ASEAN is being 
undermined by China, and China provides many challenges to historic U.S. leadership in Asia. 
 Because of its population of 1.4 billion, China will eventually become the world’s largest 
economy in terms of GDP. However, it will not soon be technologically advanced, nor highly productive, 
with a high standard of living. In constant purchasing power parity terms, China’s GDP per capita in 
constant purchasing power parity terms in 2014 was $12,609, far below Japan’s $35,635 and the United 
States’s $52,218. Growth predictions over the coming decade range widely, from 3 percent to 7 percent. 
The Japan Center for Economic Research (JCER) reasonably projects a Chinese gradually declining 
growth rate to 4.1 percent by 2025. 
 Despite political tensions, Japan has sustained good economic relations with China, especially as 
a trading partner. China is Japan’s largest export market, and fourth largest source of imports. In 2014 
bilateral trade amounted to $340 billion, the world’s third largest bilateral trade relationship.  Japan is 
the largest investor in China, with a direct investment stock of about $100 billion. However, Japanese 
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to China, which peaked at 1,076 billion yen in 2012, declined to 887 
billion yen in 2013, dropped sharply to 542 billion yen in 2014, and dropped by another 16 percent the 
first half of this year. This is partly because Chinese wage rates and labor costs have been increasing 
rapidly. It also reflects normal corporate hedging strategy in diversifying production and sources of 
supply. It is unclear how much concern about future bilateral political relations enters Japanese 
corporate decisions. Not surprisingly, the U.S. continues to be Japan’s highest FDI destination, with 
Europe not far behind.  
 Globalization, a process leading to greater mutual awareness and interdependence among a 
nation’s economic, political, and social entities, is important for Japan. The world is quite open in the 
flows of trade, capital, tourism, students, and information, though much less so for permanent migrants. 
The DHL Global Connectedness Index measures and weighs these indicators; in 2014 Japan ranked 40 
out of 140 countries. Japan rates very high in its global reach (breadth), pretty well on capital and 
information flows, but low (72nd place) in its share of trade in GDP. Japan does not import and export as 
much relative to its size as many other countries. In comparison, Singapore is the only non-European 
country in the top 10. Asia’s other entrepôt, Hong Kong, is 11; South Korea is 13; the United States is 23. 
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 Why is Japan not more connected? Its Asian neighbors are not as geographically and politically 
close or as rich as Europe. It is an island. Japanese refer to their Galapagos syndrome, a self-centered 
island interacting little with the rest of the world. The Japanese language, which few foreigners know, 
and the lack of widespread command of English in Japan, are significant barriers. 
 These measures fail to capture the reality that Japan is an open, friendly, comfortable, and very 
safe country. It has a hospitable, well-developed, burgeoning tourist industry that welcomed some 10.9 
million foreign tourists in 2014, up from 8.0 million in 2013, spending about $16.7 billion (at 120 
yen/dollar). Most (83 percent) came from Asia, notably Taiwan (25 percent), South Korea (21 percent), 
and China (16 percent). Tourism is an important way in which Chinese and Koreans, subject to negative 
media coverage at home, learn more about Japan.  
 Abe’s much-anticipated August 14 Cabinet statement on the 70th anniversary of Japan’s 
surrender in World War II has received widespread comment, some in terms of missing an opportunity 
to have gone further. It was carefully constructed in context and tone. The statement upholds Japan’s 
commitment to a “free, fair, and open international economic system,” and to “basic values such as 
freedom, democracy, and human rights.” Abe’s legacy will depend on how and in what way these broad 
goals are implemented. 
 Abe’s major policy initiative is to reshape Japan as an active, constructive, peace-oriented global 
leader, not just a major economic power. His most dramatic and controversial actions have been in 
national security. Abe has interpreted the constitution to allow limited forms of collective self-defense 
and to an expanded use outside Japan of its Self-Defense Forces for peaceful purposes. The purpose 
given is to allow Japan to work more closely with allies, especially the United States, in defending Japan, 
including protecting shipping lanes. Despite public concern and months of delaying tactics by 
opponents, the legislation passed on September 20. I do not think Japan will become militaristic in the 
foreseeable future, and in practice will be quite cautious, not internationally adventurous. While his 
heart may be in security policy, Abe will have to give economic policy major attention since that is the 




Abenomics is the government’s major economic policy program aiming to transform the Japanese 
mindset positively by setting extraordinarily ambitious longer-run targets and proposing policies to 
achieve them. These include 2 percent real growth and 3 percent nominal growth, ending deflation 
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(defined as achieving 2 percent increases in the core consumer price index), 30 percent of managerial 
positions filled by women by 2020, major reopening of nuclear power plants, and fundamental 
structural change in hard-core protected sectors including agriculture and healthcare.  
 The first arrow (target) in Abenomics is an aggressive monetary policy by the Bank of Japan (BoJ) 
to end deflation. The second arrow, flexible fiscal policy, means stimulus should be followed eventually 
by fiscal consolidation. The success depends on Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his cabinet, with strong 
input from the Ministry of Finance. The third arrow, growth strategy, innovation, and structural reform, 
depends fundamentally on the positive responses of Japanese businesses as investors and innovators, 
and households as consumers and workers. The second and third arrows are deeply interrelated since 
good growth and sufficient private demand are essential to achieve fiscal consolidation. 
 Abenomics addresses Japan’s three major economic challenges: demographic transition, the 
need to increase labor productivity growth substantially, and the need to prevent a fiscal crisis 
emanating from the inability to deal with the government’s huge debt overhang. That means it is not a 
quick fix, and there is no magic bullet. Good growth is essential to provide the resources and political 
will to carry out the wide-ranging reforms. Abenomics involves improving incentives, restructuring 
institutions, improving the regulatory system, and transforming the corporate context of employment. 
 On September 24 Abe announced his second stage of Abenomics, with three so-called new 
arrows: a GNP in current prices of ¥600 trillion, up 22 percent from 2014; increased fertility so as to 
achieve a stable population of 100 million Japanese; and increased social welfare for young as well as 
old.  All of these are restatements, but in more understandable public terms, of earlier policy 
statements, including the basic Abenomics three arrows. The statement reinforced the government’s 
intentions, but with no specifics. The growth target is another way of saying 2 percent real growth and 1 
percent or so increase in the GDP deflator based on the 2 percent CPI increase. 
Some progress has been achieved in the three years of Abenomics, but it has been a bumpy 
path, with some policy hiccups. 
 
Abenomics: Ending Deflation 
 
The most immediate goal (the first arrow) has been to end the small but persistent deflation that arose 
some 15 years ago, and to achieve an annual 2 percent increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). For 
analytical purposes, considerable emphasis is placed on core CPI, which in Japan excludes fresh food 
prices and factors out the one-shot effects of consumption tax increases. 
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 When Haruhiko Kuroda became the governor of the Bank of Japan (BoJ) in April 2013, he 
committed to achieving this goal by March 2016 (the end of fiscal 2015). He has actively pursued an easy 
monetary policy, including a surprising further easing on October 31, 2014. This is the correct policy, and 
Kuroda has been steadfast despite some opposition.  CPI became positive once Kuroda’s policy was 
implemented and rose to a peak of 1.5 percent in April 2014. Less anti-deflation progress has been 
made than expected. This was evident even before the dramatic decline in oil prices introduced a 
temporary deflationary blip. 
By July 2015 the CPI had dropped to zero, and in August was minus 0.1 percent, as the sharp 
drop in oil prices wended its way through the economy.  
However the coming months will bring better performance. CPI will resume an upward trend as 
global oil prices eventually stabilize. Japan’s deflationary mindset has weakened significantly, but has 
not disappeared. Given the ongoing challenges of achieving adequate private sector aggregate demand, 
I expect Japan’s very low interest rate policy will continue for several years at least. Increases may reach 
1 percent relatively soon, but Kuroda has had to delay reaching the 2 percent target by six months to 
September 2016, and he will have to announce a further delay. Achieving 2 percent will require further 
BoJ stimulus. Whether and when the target is reached are major uncertainties. I had thought this would 
not happen until next year, but with discouraging economic news in early October, it may well take 
place soon. 
 
Abenomics: Fiscal Policy 
 
Flexible fiscal policy is the second arrow of Abenomics. In principle, the policy is to stimulate until 
private aggregate demand generates full employment growth, and then to contract to reduce the 
government budget deficit and eventually reduce the high gross government debt/GDP ratio of 246 
percent. (The net debt ratio is 130 percent.)  
 The major policy debate continues to be whether, for the next several years, to give higher 
priority to an austere budget policy of reducing pensions and other welfare expenditures and raising the 
consumption tax, or to follow a full employment growth strategy by maintaining fiscal stimulus to 
maintain adequate domestic demand. That is, which do Japanese policy makers and the public fear 
more: stagnation or fiscal crisis?  
 Based on the experience of developed countries, my view is that growth is a better path than 
austerity to resolve macroeconomic difficulties. However, strong pressure must be maintained on policy 
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makers to carry out necessary yet politically difficult structural reforms so that further increases in the 
deficit can are minimized and the government debt/GDP ratio is stabilized. The high debt ratio cannot 
increase indefinitely; that would eventually create a fiscal crisis as bondholders lose confidence in the 
government’s ability to repay.  
 Which government expenditures should be reduced and by how much, and what taxes should 
be increased and by how much, are uncertain and actively debated. Government welfare expenditures, 
mainly pensions and medical care, are projected to increase about ¥1 trillion ($8.3 billion) annually as 
the population ages. The government has yet to decide how much to reduce pensions or to increase co-
payments for medical care. 
 The 2014 consumption tax increase from 5 percent to 8 percent had a deeper and longer-lasting 
adverse effect on private consumption and business investment than I and most commentators 
expected. Was the tax increase an essential first step in averting a fiscal crisis seven or eight years down 
the road, or was it too costly economically in terms of GDP volatility and growth foregone? Many 
specialists differ, and I don’t have a good answer. So much depends on Japanese (and foreign) 
expectations about Japan’s future.  
 Abe postponed increasing the consumption tax to 10 percent, rescheduling it from October 
2015 until March 2017, but has stated it will not be delayed further. This implies that whatever growth 
momentum is achieved in the next eighteen months will be temporarily dampened. 
 A policy to reduce corporate tax rates over several years continued in April. Japan previously 
had a total statutory rate of 37 percent, second highest in the industrialized world (behind only the 
United States). The 2015 effective rate will fall 2.51 percentage points to 32.11 percent.  
 Government revenues increased by ¥4 trillion more than conservatively budgeted for fiscal 
2014, and probably about that much in fiscal 2015, thanks in part to the consumption tax rise. This 
provides the government leeway to delay fiscal reform, but eventually that will be necessary. Akira 
Amari, minister for economic and fiscal policy, on September 8 suggested using ¥2 trillion ($84 billion) of 
the “surplus” revenues to finance a demand-stimulus supplementary budget, in light of China’s 
slowdown. This would be less than the ¥3.5 trillion 2014 supplementary budget, and the ¥5.5 trillion in 
2013. I assume Amari’s proposal will be enacted before this fiscal year ends. 
 To carry out fiscal reform, Japan must cut welfare expenditures, raise taxes, and reform the tax 
system—and do so without hurting the poor and middle classes, or the elderly. This implies that 
adjustment costs should fall mainly on households in the top 10 percent to 20 percent of income. One 
approach is to reduce their pension benefits and increase their share of medical expenses. 
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 However, Japan has been relying on increases in the consumption (value-added) tax rather than 
in other taxes because it is widely understood, easy to measure, and reluctantly tolerated by the general 
public, even though it hits poorer people harder.  
 My views on tax structure are not widely accepted in Japan. First, as a partial offset to increasing 
inequality, Japan should consider a national property tax with exemptions for owners with net assets 
below a certain level, in addition to the local government property taxes; however, in addition to 
political difficulties, the necessary data are not available. Second, I favor a progressive income tax. Third, 
I support a high carbon tax on CO2 emissions to reduce their environmental costs, especially if this can 
be coordinated internationally.  
 While it will be necessary to raise taxes further after 2017, this will be politically difficult. Japan 
will face a tough choice between government expenditure cuts and further tax increases. That is one 
reason good growth over the next several years is so important politically as well as economically and 
socially. 
 
Abenomics: Growth Strategy 
 
Growth provides the resources to make adjustment less costly and more flexible. Major structural 
changes are necessary to achieve good growth. Thus, the third arrow of Abenomics is to “revitalize” 
Japan’s economy to achieve sustained, full-employment, rapid growth.  
 The third arrow has become a broad label under which every potential economic policy can find 
a home. There are three basic aspects: implementation will take several years, the private business 
sector will play the dominant role, and the results will be achieved over the longer run. Most third-arrow 
initiatives focus on increasing corporate profitability through better corporate management and 
governance, more innovation, IT (information technology) promotion, and development of human 
resources.  
 On June 30 the government issued a revised revitalization and growth strategy. It is a wide-
ranging document, which proposes both broad policy measures and some specific examples. It includes 
six major projects involving innovative technologies by the time of the 2020 Tokyo Olympics: next-
generation transportation systems, energy management, robotics, medical care; 20 million foreign 
tourists, and increased inward foreign direct investment. Deregulation to achieve more pro-business, 
but also more competitive, markets is stressed, particularly where “bed-rock regulations” have 
remained so strong, notably in agriculture, healthcare, energy, and employment. 
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 The government has begun to announce, legislate, and implement policies in these and other 
important areas. Some progress has been made, but there is a long way to go. Some actions are 
particularly important symbolically, signaling the cracking of well-established economic barriers. 
 Agriculture is a prime example. It is economically insignificant, producing only 1.2 percent of 
GDP and employing only 3.4 percent of the work force. Nonetheless, the 1.3 million commercial farming 
households, while now only 2.6 percent of all households, are the backbone for most villages and small 
towns, and are politically and socially important. JA (the Japan Agriculture Group) through JA-Zenchu 
(the short-form Japanese for the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, which is JA’s organization 
handling a comprehensive range of farm policy activities including handling the purchase of fuel, seeds, 
and other inputs and half of rice sales, among other activities), is very powerful. As a result, Japanese 
farmers have been heavily protected: average farm household incomes are higher than non-farm 
households. 
 Most farms are so small that they cannot be competitive for most crops – particularly rice. 
Nonetheless, Abe has included agriculture in the third arrow strategy, envisaging farms growing world-
class products for export. Agriculture is a traumatically but amicably declining industry, with the number 
of active farmers falling and the area farmed decreasing. According to the 2014 Japanese census of 
agriculture, the average age of Japanese farmers is 66.8 years, with 63 percent of farmers above 65. 
Eventually they will be replaced by some 200,000 younger households with larger farms and greater 
productive efficiency. 
 It is good news that Japan’s food self-sufficiency rate, at 39 percent in caloric terms, remains 
below the government’s target of 45 percent. Japan is efficiently relying on inexpensive food imports 
rather than very inefficient domestic production. Food security is provided by assuring adequate 
inventories of grains, soybeans, meat, and other storables. 
 The government is pursuing policies to accelerate agricultural adjustment smoothly. In February 
it forced JA-Zenchu to agree to limit its control over individual JA cooperatives at the village level. JA’s 
special legal status will be changed to that of an ordinary incorporated association, and it loses its sole 
power to audit and guide local cooperatives. Nonetheless JA will continue to be influential, particularly 
through the credit and other local financial associations it continues to control. Most farmers grow 
products under the guidance of the JA group and use the group’s distribution channels to ship the 
products to market. This gives Zenchu a significant influence on rice prices. With the ending in 2018 of 
the rice production quota program, rice prices will become more flexible. 
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 This is Japan’s first major agricultural reform since the 1950s, and has major symbolic 
significance. Substantively it may not achieve much directly, but it will probably lead to broader reforms. 
When TPP is implemented, it will have greater direct substantive impact since it will significantly reduce 
agricultural tariffs and other import barriers. Rice tariffs currently run more than 700 percent. <> 
 Labor force reforms have been mixed and limited. Japan’s labor force is 66.2 million (June 2015 
seasonally adjusted), down from the peak of 68.1 million in June 1997; 37.6 million (57 percent) are 
male and 28.5 million are female. The unemployment rate in July was 3.3 percent, and the ratio of 
positions open to those available is the highest it has been in 23 years. In the two and one-half years 
since January 2013 male employment increased by 100,000 and female employment by 900,000. The 
Abe government attributes much of this to its “womenomics” policy of making it easier for women to 
work. However, it was mainly due to increased demand for labor in tightening labor markets.  
 Abe’s policy to increase the number of women in managerial positions to 30 percent by 2020 is 
dramatically ambitious, and unrealistic. One problem is the small number of women in company or 
government employee cohorts who could be promoted to managerial positions over the next five to ten 
years. Many listed companies are now hiring more women entering their management tracks, so in 15 
years or so the 30 percent target may become achievable.  
 Though it is gradually evolving, Japanese corporate culture continues to be male-dominated. 
Women hold less than 9 percent of managerial positions. Company culture is evolving and probably can 
cope with relatively small numbers of female managers. However, when as many as 30 percent of 
managers are women, the management lifestyle and culture will change significantly. 
 While Japan, like all developed countries, seeks highly skilled foreign professionals, basically its 
immigration and foreign worker policies are restrictive and minimal. Japan would benefit from more 
foreign workers, unskilled as well as skilled, but is liberalizing very cautiously. Of the 788,000 legal 
foreign workers in Japan – 1.3 percent of the labor force – 339,000 are Brazilian and others with 
Japanese heritage, 147,000 are skilled workers, 145,000 are technical interns, and 120,000 are foreign 
students with part-time work permits. 
 The main policy initiative is to open Japan to add about 60,000 foreign skilled workers a year on 
five-year contracts, lengthened from three years. Indicative of the policy mindset is that in July the 
government announced new policies whereby foreigners working in one of the national strategic zones 
(mainly Tokyo, Yokohama, and Osaka) would be able to obtain visas for foreign housekeepers. But why 
are Japanese not allowed to do this, and why not anywhere in Japan? This is one way to increase the 
opportunity for married women to enter the labor force.  
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 Abenomics proposes to strengthen the university system by creating distinguished graduate 
schools and special research institutions. Japan’s university system is strong overall, but a significant 
part is a declining sector, namely two-year colleges and local private, low-ranked, four-year colleges. 
This is because of fewer enrollments as the numbers of college-age Japanese has been decreasing.  
 Undergraduate students peaked at 2.9 million in 2011, as did graduate students at 272,000. 
Since national and other public universities are of high quality, decreasing enrollments are mostly in 
private institutions. The number of private four-year colleges increased from 542 in 2004 to a peak of 
606 in 2013, and has now begun to decline. This will be a slow, difficult process as weaker colleges 
reluctantly merge or close due to lack of students. Private junior colleges have decreased from 451 in 
2004 to 334 in 2014 and enrollments dropped from 214,000 to 129,000.  
 
Growth in the Longer Run 
 
Optimistically assuming aggregate demand will be adequate, Japan’s growth over the longer run 
depends on the supply side: changes in the labor force and its skills, growth in capital stock, innovations, 
and other improvements that increase productivity and output. GDP growth is estimated by increases in 
labor force (ideally, hours worked), net additions to the capital stock, and innovation and other 
measures that increase productivity, namely total factor productivity (TFP, the Solow residual in growth 
accounting). In complex, interactive processes, TFP is determined by R&D, education, inventions, and 
other innovations.  
 Japan achieved high productivity growth during the postwar decades to 1990 as companies 
succeeded in bringing Japan to, and beyond, the global technology frontier in manufacturing. Since then, 
productivity has inevitably slowed. Considerable growth can be gained by allocating workers and capital 
more efficiently. That is one major focus of Abenomics’ ambitious third arrow reforms. 
 Japan’s labor force will soon decrease about 0.5 percent a year; potential further increases in 
the participation rates of women and older workers are only a one-shot offset spread over several years. 
Japan’s growth depends essentially on increasing labor productivity, that is, real GDP produced per hour 
worked. Japanese labor skills, capital stock, and technology levels are already high. But, Japan’s 
productivity lags seriously behind other G7 countries, and in 2013 was only 61.6 percent of the U.S. 
level. 
 In March 2015, McKenzie Global Institute published a comprehensive, detailed, ambitious, 
optimistic, 128-page study, “The Future of Japan: Reigniting Productivity and Growth.” It recommends a 
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wide range of specific measures, particularly for the business sector, to achieve a “broader adoption of 
best global practices, a wave of investment in new technologies, and a greater willingness to try bold 
new business models.” The study aspirationally lays out what Japan should do. 
 The government’s June 30, 2015 growth strategy states what the government intends to do over 
the next five years or so. The ambitious 2 percent growth target implies that labor productivity will have 
to increase by 2.2 percent annually, and TFP comparably. This is much higher than has been achieved in 
the last 25 years.  
 Like most observers, I do not think Japan will achieve sustained 2 percent GDP growth. The 
government is unlikely to implement its full package of third-arrow structural reforms. Its baseline 
projection is more realistic: 1 percent growth, sustained full employment, a CPI increase of about 1.5 
percent, and a leveling off of the government debt/GDP ratio. Real GDP growth of 1 percent would be 
pretty good: GDP/capita would increase about 1.5 percent or so, almost double its performance since 
1992.  
 IMF projections are cautious: while the GDP growth rate will increase from 0.8 percent in 2015 
to 1.2 percent in 2016, the increase in the consumption tax to 10 percent in April 2017 will slow growth 
to 0.4 percent, and from 2018 growth will be 0.7 percent annually through 2020. This reflects IMF 
concern about the still disappointing levels of business investment and slow progress in labor market 
reform, notably the inability of firms to discharge permanent workers, and the rising number of non-
regular workers with their relatively low wages and limited fringe benefits. 
 The longer-run bottom line: with decreasing labor inputs, 2 percent growth would be 
outstanding, but almost impossible to achieve. Even if Abenomics is very successful in carrying out major 
structural reforms and in ending deflation, achieving growth of about 1.5 percent would be very good. It 





In Japan, as elsewhere, effective corporate governance is a system in which companies make good, 
prompt, fair decisions; engage in sufficient disclosure to be reasonably transparent; and take into 
appropriate consideration the interests of their shareholders, customers, employees, and communities. 
In practice, more so than elsewhere, every Japanese company, large and small, has its own, strong, self-
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replicating corporate culture based on insiders, often with ambiguous or weak internal checks and 
balances. Reform is needed because corporate management is entrenched, autonomous, and powerful.  
 Corporate governance reform of companies listed on the stock exchanges is a major policy 
objective of the Abenomics growth strategy, and its implementation is making good progress. The basic 
objectives are to make managers of publicly traded company more responsible to, and responsive to, 
shareholders and potential investors, though not to fundamentally change the existing system of 
entrenched management. The focus is on making companies more competitive, more profitable, and 
engaging in adequate disclosure and transparency. 
 Listed companies (there are about 3,500, including 1,895 on the Tokyo Stock Exchange [TSE] first 
section) can be classified into several overlapping models of corporate control and internally based 
governance. Founder family influence continues well after a company is first listed, but over time the 
company evolves into control by entrenched professional management based on permanent 
employment, promotion, and internal selection of the top positions of president, chairman, and almost 
all board members. Some companies have developed a strong CEO-based model, making it possible to 
make and implement strategic decisions more rapidly. In some cases retired CEOs continue to exercise 
strong power in advisory positions.  
 Legally shareholders have more power in Japan than in the United States, but have not used it. 
Most Japanese institutional investors accept management control in turn for receiving stable, gradually 
increasing dividends and non-interference in their own businesses. Cross shareholdings have helped 
managements protect their interests. Earlier, highly publicized hostile take-over efforts by activist 
foreign investors failed, but now activist institutional investors, especially foreign but also some 
domestic, are pressing companies with huge cash holdings to significantly increase dividends and share 
buy-backs.  They also press companies to raise their currently low returns on investments and assets.  
Foreign institutions hold about 32 percent of shares listed on the TSE. 
 The TSE and the Financial Services Agency, with public input, introduced the important new 
Corporate Governance Code on June 1. It focuses on best practices and follows the OECD (Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development) model.  
 Japan’s Code is not legally binding, but has strong reputational force; it is both a symbol and a 
driver of corporate change. The Code establishes five major categories of principles to which listed 
companies must comply, or explain and justify non-compliance. Two major changes are the 
appointment of at least two independent, outside directors on the company’s board, and disclosure of 
the company’s overall policy and voting criteria for cross-shareholding, in order to reduce such holdings. 
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Other principles focus on disclosure and transparency, appropriate cooperation with all stakeholders, 
and use of stock options to link compensation of top executives to company performance.  
 The percentage of all listed companies having at least one outside director was 12.9 percent in 
2010 and 21.5 percent in 2014; 92 percent of TSE first section firms have at least one outside director. 
To meet the target of at least two outside, independent directors, TSE first and second section 
companies will need to make 1,848 new appointments. More important than sheer numbers will be he 
quality, knowledge, and, especially, the commitment to be truly independent and questioning. In the 
past, outside directors have often been marginalized, with basic strategic issues decided by 
management and then simply ratified by the board. 
 Cross-shareholding has been a basic mechanism of management control in the postwar period. 
Banks had to divest major holdings of group companies in earlier financial reforms, but many companies 
continue to hold shares in each other. Many of the holdings are to maintain business relationships, 
which can mean helping to fend off hostile shareholders. While the government cannot legally require 
companies to end cross-shareholding completely in order to increase transparency, the Corporate 
Governance Code now requires companies listed on the TSE to explain the rationale for holdings. Some 
60 percent of the 300 biggest companies have sold some cross-shareholdings, but it is premature to 
determine how far and how rapidly this will proceed. 
 The government-backed JPX-Nikkei 400 Index selects the best-performing companies based on 
three-year average return on equity, cumulative operating profit, and market value. In its second annual 
revision of the index in August, 42 firms were added, replacing companies performing less well. Since 
management aspires to have the company included, it has incentives to improve. Commentators refer 
to the JPX-Nikkei 400 as the “shame index” since it is shameful for a large company not to be included. 
This may be appropriate, since shame in Japan is often more of a motivator than merit. 
 The Toshiba Corporation scandal—using inappropriate accounting to inflate total group 
operating profits by more than 10 percent over five years through March 2014—is a shock. Toshiba is a 
globally well-regarded brand and a prestigious, innovative company ranked seventh globally in patents 
received. With four outside directors, it was presumed to embody good corporate governance. 
Apparently, Toshiba’s strong leadership set unrealistically aggressive profit targets that middle 
management feared to challenge, and internal checks and balances were inadequate. While the 
Olympus scandal a few years ago was an aberration, the Toshiba case raises wider concerns as to how 





Energy is probably Japan’s greatest vulnerability, both in environmental terms and in assured sources of 
supply. Japan’s long-run energy policy is simple: to obtain stable supplies at low cost. Implementation is 
complex and difficult in what is a global, dynamic, rapidly changing set of related industries.  
 Fossil fuels are the predominant energy sources for Japan, as for all developed countries. They 
are relatively cheap, but create greenhouse gases and pollutants. Having mined out all its coal long ago, 
Japan has to import essentially all its oil, LNG (liquefied natural gas), and coal. Security of supply is a 
major geopolitical concern. One issue is how to achieve the best mix among fossil, nuclear, and 
renewable resources.  
 The world is in a disruptive energy revolution based on the rapid development of cheap shale oil 
and gas, as well as ongoing efforts to harness solar and wind power. Energy costs and prices are 
dropping dramatically. In Japan and globally, a myriad of ongoing technological advances, large and 
small, increase the efficiency of energy production, transportation, and distribution to industrial and 
household users, and their better use. 
 The drop in the world price of oil (Brent crude) from its last peak of $117 per barrel in August 
2013 to $42 in August 2015 is currently substantially benefiting Japan through improved terms of trade, 
even as it makes it more difficult to achieve the 2 percent CPI rise target. LNG has been sold globally and 
to Japan under long-term fixed-price contracts linked to the price of oil. Markets have been opaque and 
only gradually are becoming more flexible. Over time Japanese companies have successfully negotiated 
down the substantial premiums they have paid for LNG. 
 The greatest achievement of the third arrow thus far has been in energy policy, implementing 
major reforms to reduce the monopolistic power of the 10 regional electric power companies, from 
Hokkaido to Okinawa. The retail market for electric power is to be fully liberalized in a year or so, and by 
2020 the companies have to spin off their generation, transmission, and distribution businesses into 
separate companies.  
 The Fukushima crisis undermined Japan’s ability to continue as a global path-breaking leader 
regarding climate change. It will fail to meet its Kyoto Protocol commitments to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by 25 percent from 1990 levels by 2020, as will many other countries. At the G7 June 2015 
meeting, Abe announced a more modest target of reducing emissions by 26 percent below the 2013 
level by 2030, equivalent to 18 percent less than 1990. Even that will be a substantial achievement. 
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 Some three-quarters of Japan’s energy use is fuel for motor vehicles and gas for heating, 
cooling, and cooking. The other quarter is to generate electricity.  
 Japan is so deficient in natural resources that in 2014 it imported more than 90 percent of its 
primary energy supply. (Primary energy refers to an energy form found in nature that has not been 
subjected to any conversion or transformation process). Japan is the world's largest LNG importer, 
second-largest coal importer, and third-largest net importer of crude oil and oil products. Stability and 
security of fossil fuel imports, as well as their prices, appropriately are top-priority foreign policy 
concerns. Japan imports 82 percent of its oil from the Middle East, 33 percent from Saudi Arabia alone. 
LNG imports are considerably more diversified. Australia, Malaysia, and Qatar are the major suppliers, 
providing three-quarters of total imports. Domestically, hydroelectric provides about 3 percent of total 
energy supply and about 8 percent of electricity. Before being shut down, nuclear energy provided 
about 30 percent of electricity, and this had been expected to increase to at least 40 percent by 2017.  
 On June 30, METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) announced its projection for 2030 
of the mix of sources for primary energy and electricity production. The government supports research 
to achieve energy free of fossil fuels in the very long run, based on hydrogen and nuclear fusion 
technologies. However, for the next 20 to 30 years at least, Japan will continue to rely predominantly on 
fossil fuels. 
 In 2030, oil, coal, and LNG are projected to provide 75 percent of the primary energy supply, 
down from 92 percent in 2013 and 82 percent in 2010. Renewables will provide 13 to 14 percent, and 
nuclear power 10 to 11 percent. The big changes are projected for electricity generation: renewables 
will comprise 22–24 percent and nuclear power 20–22 percent. Three aspects of these projections are 
striking. 
 First is the continued importance of coal, generating 26 percent of electricity, slightly above the 
average 24 percent in the 10 years before Fukushima. Japanese companies have developed effective 
clean-coal technology and are seeking to export it, but it is expensive and will require strong anti-
pollution commitments by importing countries. In Japan, new, large scale coal-based electricity projects 
are both clean and apparently cost competitive; although upfront capital costs are high, interest rates 
and operating costs are low. Existing coal-based plants will be mostly replaced by 2030. Coal’s greatest 
competitive challenge in Japan will continue to be LNG and nuclear power. 
 The projected major reliance on nuclear power once again by 2030 implies not only reopening 
many of existing plants, but also building new ones. I am not persuaded this will be achieved. Given the 
current adverse views of the Japanese public following Fukushima, this will require a major change in 
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the public mindset. Since electricity prices have increased 29 percent for business and 19 percent for 
household since Fukushima, reductions attributed to cheap nuclear power generation will be important 
in overcoming Japanese anxieties. Safe nuclear power generation does not pollute the air, though 
disposal of radioactive waste and decommissioning of old plants are serious unresolved issues. Security 
of fuel supply is not a problem; uranium is readily imported from a geographically diversified range of 
democracies.  
 All of Japan’s 54 nuclear power plants were closed by September 2013 following the Great East 
Japan Earthquake in March 2011, when three reactors were destroyed in Fukushima. The Nuclear 
Regulatory Authority (NRA) has developed new, stringent safety regulations. As a result, companies have 
already decided to decommission seven older plants because upgrading costs to meet the new 
standards are too high. 
 As many as 32 of Japan’s 43 operable plants are possible candidates to reopen. So far the NRA 
has approved reopening 5 plants and another 16 are under review. However a 2015 Reuters analysis 
concludes that only seven are likely to be restarted over the next several years. Moreover, at least 13 
reactors would need to have their lifetimes extended beyond the 40-year normal limit. 
 Despite substantial economic benefits, the reopening process has been careful and cautious. 
Kyushu Electric Power in Kagoshima Prefecture has reopened the first nuclear power plant, restarting 
operations on August 14; it took 11 months to reopen after the September 2014 approval, both to 
ensure details and overcome regional, if not local, opposition. The first plant reopenings will be a critical 
test as to whether Japanese will accept nuclear power once again and put the country on track for the 
2030 nuclear target, which seems difficult to achieve.  
 Fossil fuels are essential, but they are not good for one’s health. Air pollution kills people 
quietly. My colleague David Weinstein estimates that if Japan had not closed its nuclear plants following 
Fukushima, and thereby burned less fossil fuel, more than 9,000 Japanese lives would have been saved 
annually. No one has died from radiation leakage and the nuclear meltdown at Fukushima, though the 
dislocation costs of those directly affected were substantial. 
 As noted, renewable energy sources are expected to increase significantly to 22–24 percent of 
electricity generation. Hydropower will be about 9 percent. The big renewable increase will be in solar, 
to some 7 percent, a consequence of the exuberant corporate response to Japan’s extraordinarily high 
subsidies (feed-in tariffs) for electricity sold to Japan’s 10 utilities, initially 42 yen per kilowatt hour. Solar 
power prices and installation costs have been dropping sharply. Some 82 percent of Japan’s $34.3 billion 
investment in renewables in 2014 (second only to the United States’s $36.3 billion) was in small-scale 
20 
projects, where the feed-in tariff rate as of July ranged between 27 and 35 yen per kilowatt hour. 
However, the growth of solar facilities is constrained by suitable sites and access to power grids.  
 Biomass burning, considered less polluting than fossil fuels, will generate 3.7 percent to 4.6 
percent of electricity. Since bamboo grows so rapidly, two new bamboo-based plants are under 
construction. Wind will remain costly, so is projected to contribute only 1.7 percent. In volcanic Japan, 
geothermal plants will provide the final 1.0 percent; however most sources are in national parks, where 
tourist hot springs businesses resist their intrusion. 
 One major problem is that solar and wind power are unreliable since they are intermittent and 
volatile. This limits the ability of power grids to handle electricity supply flows smoothly as daily demand 
fluctuates. Huge, efficient storage batteries or new methods for storing electric power cheaply and 
efficiently are essential. Several Japanese and U.S. companies are leaders in developing large storage 
batteries, as well as batteries for electric cars. 
 In the coming decades, radically new technologies almost surely will further alter global energy 
sources and supplies dramatically. They will involve major breakthroughs to achieve efficiencies, cost 
competitiveness, and environmental benefits, as well as social and political acceptance. The most 
controversial will be nuclear power – the traveling wave reactor that burns its own nuclear waste and 
other major new fission technology, and eventually nuclear fusion. Artificial photosynthesis, replacing 
plants, is being developed to produce hydrocarbons to fuel motor vehicles. NH3 (ammonia) is being 
proposed as a hydrogen-carrying fuel. 
 For Japan, methane hydrate (natural gas in frozen deposits) could become a major fuel source. 
Japan has found some 750 deposits in its coastal waters. Methane hydrate is globally abundant but 
costly to mine. The government-owned Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation has been doing 
research on methane hydrate since 1995, and in 2013 its ship Chikyu dug wells and extracted natural gas 
samples in the Nankai Trough. The government plans further testing in late 2016 of its methane hydrate 
well to resolve technical difficulties, which cut the 2013 effort short. It estimates that it will take at least 
a decade before costs can be reduced sufficiently for methane hydrate to be commercially competitive. 
This is probably optimistic. Nonetheless, methane hydrate may eventually become Japan’s major source 
of gas. In one form or another, gas will increase significantly beyond the 2030 projection, as the nuclear 





In the 70 years since Japan’s surrender in 1945, Japan has done very well economically, politically, and 
socially. It has achieved a high standard of living, with high educational attainment and high levels of 
technology. It has embodied democratic principles, policies, and institutions, with full respect for the 
rule of law. It has pursued a peace-oriented, indeed pacifist, international policy, with a small but 
competent self-defense force, and deep reliance on its security treaty and close relationship with the 
United States. Life expectancy has increased for women from 54 in 1950 to 88 today, and for men from 
50 to 80.  
 Japan is a comfortable, clean, safe, and friendly country. One of Japan’s strengths is that it 
adjusts to tremendous demographic and economic change in a stable, usually rather gradual, non-
disruptive way. Even though the process may seem inefficiently slow, it maintains a high degree of social 
cohesion, especially important in Japan’s homogenous, group-oriented society. 
 Japan has the same sorts of problems as other economically advanced democracies. Its relative 
poverty rate, measured as income less than half of median disposable income, is 16 percent, sixth 
highest of the 34 OECD members; the United States is fifth highest. The large and rising proportion of 
non-regular workers, now 37 percent of the labor force, is disquieting. They have lower hourly wages 
and fewer fringe benefits, which makes many of them members of the working poor. The lowest 10 
percent of Japan’s income recipients have had an absolute decrease in their income since the mid-
1980s.   
 The annual survey on living conditions in 2004 found 44.2 percent considered their living 
conditions as normal or comfortable, and 23.0 percent as very hard. In almost every year since, 
respondents have been less satisfied, particularly when the consumption tax was increased. In 2014, 
36.8 percent felt their living conditions were normal or comfortable, but 29.7 percent considered life 
very hard.  
 Japan’s first 15 postwar years, to 1960, saw demilitarization, Allied Occupation reforms (to 
1952), independence (since 1952), creation of new institutions, and development of new opportunities. 
The next era of 30 years, to 1990, provided unprecedentedly rapid, catch-up economic growth, and 
achievement of Japan’s high standard of living. The past 25 years have been an era of mediocre 
economic growth, and a modest but rising sense of malaise and decreased optimism about the future. 
At the same time, Japan’s broad self-image persists as a peaceful, comfortable, insulated country not 
much involved in international political, security, or social issues.  
 However, today’s world is complicated and difficult. Japan’s economic power and its global 
economic breadth are too great to allow Japan to persist in being insular and passive. At the same time 
22 
Japan’s leadership in Asia, assiduously built up over the postwar period, is now being eroded by a huge, 
rapidly growing but still poor, resurgent China.  
Prime Minister Abe is pursuing a very ambitious long-run policy to redefine Japan not just 
economically but in terms of its appropriate international role, with the expanded peace-keeping and 
humanitarian Self-Defense Forces. While Abenomics has broad support despite vested interests, Abe’s 
national security policy has yet to be widely accepted, and thus is the major challenge Abe faces. 
 Some commentators have been sharply critical of the performance of Abenomics. However, 
Abenomics is a long-run program to bring about fundamental economic reform. I think monetary policy 
is successfully bringing the deflationary mindset to an end. The 2 percent CPI annual increase will not be 
achieved any time soon, but the BoJ should persist in this very ambitious target. The sustained 2 percent 
growth target probably cannot be achieved. However, in order to overcome pessimistic expectations, it 
is important for Abe to pursue both these targets wholeheartedly. 
 How Japan will deal with its fiscal policy reform—the second arrow of Abenomics—is the most 
difficult area of government policy. There is a major policy conflict between fiscal austerity—reducing 
welfare expenditures and raising taxes—and providing sufficient government demand to sustain full 
employment growth. If Abenomics succeeds in bringing about major structural reform, if household 
consumption and business investment respond well, and good economic growth is achieved, then tax 
revenues will grow enough that less severe austerity measures will be required. Current economic 
performance provides a couple of years of leeway before the government will have to confront these 
issues head on.  
 I continue to worry about inadequate private demand in Japan. The economy is too big to 
expect exports to be a main source of stimulus. Two main challenges are to raise productivity closer to 
U.S. levels, and relatedly, to raise wages significantly. To drive growth, consumption must increase. That 
means household income must rise, which means wages must increase more than they have this year. It 
is puzzling that, with labor markets so tight, wages have not increased more. Perhaps labor market 
pressure will manifest itself more strongly in the year ahead.  
 The reality of good Japanese economic performance from now on reflects the difficulty of large 
percentage increases in traditional measures when the levels are already high. With a declining labor 
force and population, 1 percent or so real growth actually is pretty good over the longer run. Japan’s 
standard of living (GDP per capita) would improve at a historically good 1.5 percent or so. With 
continued advances in medical care and technology, the quality of life can be expected to improve even 
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more. This is the reality of good Japanese performance in the longer run, so the Japanese and those of 
us who study and care about Japan will have to adjust our mindset accordingly. 
 
October 9, 2015 
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